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Abstract
Does school accountability change the teacher composition in schools? We exploit
a nested school accountability reform to estimate the causal eﬀect of accountability on
teacher mobility and teacher sorting. In 2003, lower secondary schools in Oslo became
formally accountable to the school district authority. In 2005, a value added measure of
student achievement in lower secondary schools also became public information. Both
when using a double and a triple diﬀerence estimator, we ﬁnd signiﬁcantly increased
teacher mobility. Almost all teachers that moved left the teaching sector entirely. Non-
stayers were largely replaced by high-ability teachers, yielding a positive sorting eﬀect
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1 Introduction
School accountability is intended to reduce the principal-agent problem in education by pro-
viding incentives for teachers to boost student achievement and thereby school performance.
However, school accountability may also induce teacher mobility and work as a sorting mech-
anism. For instance, student achievement is not directly attributable to teacher behavior. In
fact, many elements inﬂuencing student achievement are out of the teachers' control.1 Making
teachers accountable might therefore induce negative pressure and more risk on teachers, and
hence trigger teacher mobility. In addition, school accountability may increase the adminis-
trative workload for teachers and may crowd out their intrinsic motivation.2 Moreover, it may
cause a shift in focus, from student learning to student testing. This may induce disutility
for some teachers. Teacher mobility might further aﬀect the composition of teachers within
schools. Diﬀerences in the turnover decisions made by high- and low-ability teachers may in-
duce teacher sorting. If low-quality teachers move and are replaced by high-quality teachers,
the sorting eﬀect could be intentional, and could increase overall teacher quality.
In this paper, we study if school accountability has an impact on teacher turnover and
teacher composition, and whether it works as a sorting mechanism. We exploit a management
reform from 2003 that made schools internally accountable to the school district authority
for student achievement, and the fact that a market-element was added in 2005: Information
on school performance, a measure of conditional student achievement, became public, making
schools also externally accountable.
1See Kane and Stagier (2002) and Koretz (2002) for the pitfalls of imprecise school accountability measures.
2Extensive work by Deci and Ryan (e.g., 1985, 2000) indicates that too much control or distrust might
negatively inﬂuence an individual's intrinsic motivation. Whereas school accountability is meant to give
teachers more autonomy in the classroom, school quality measures might be perceived as a signal of distrust.
See Fehr and Falk (2002) concerning the psychology of incentives in general.
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When studying turnover and recruitment, economists have traditionally emphasized pe-
cuniary variables and to a lesser extent organizational and social structures. However, there
is a growing interest in such topics. For example, Boyd et al. (2011) ﬁnd that teachers with
better pre-service qualiﬁcations are more likely to apply for a transfer, while teachers whose
students demonstrate higher achievements are less so. Jackson (2009) studies the causal eﬀect
of changes in student characteristics on teacher sorting. He ﬁnds a decline in teacher quality
in schools with increased black enrollment share due to these schools losing experienced and
eﬀective teachers.
Although there exists a vast literature on teacher mobility and sorting, their eﬀects have
largely been overlooked in the school accountability literature. Numerous studies have found
that school accountability has a positive eﬀect on student test scores (e.g., Rouse et al.,
2013), however there is no real consensus on the mechanism through which the impact of
accountability takes place.3
Confounding sorting eﬀects play an important role in other settings. Lazear (2000) ﬁnds
that introducing performance pay in the auto glass sector increased productivity by 44 %. Half
of the increase was attributed to sorting, the other half to incentives. In a ﬁeld experiment,
Leuven et al. (2011) ﬁnd that more able students tend to select themselves into tournaments
with the higher prizes, and ﬁnd no eﬀect of tournament participation on study eﬀort and
exam results. Their results indicate that the non-experimental results are completely due to
sorting, not incentives.
3Hanushek and Raymond (2004)) ﬁnd that just reporting results has minimal impact and that the force of
accountability comes from attaching sanctions and rewards. Bishop et al. (2001) ﬁnd that the stick is more
eﬀective than the carrot. Harri and Herrington (2006) argue that the positive eﬀects of accountability should
mainly be attributed to the existence of exit exams. Rouse et al. (2013) show that improvement in student
achievement can be attributed to changes in teaching practices.
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The literature on school accountability focuses mainly on channels through which school
rankings can induce gaming responses: Teachers increase the use of special education place-
ments (Jacob, 2005; Figlio and Getzler, 2006), substitute away from low-stakes subjects
(Figlio, 2006), teach for the test (Jacob, 2005), cheat (Jacob and Levitt, 2003), and shift
more attention to students in the middle of the achievement distribution in order to inﬂate
accountability scores (Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010).
Feng et al. (2011) are one of few to study the eﬀect of school accountability on teacher
mobility.4 They exploit a change in Florida's school accountability system that exogenously
shocked some schools to higher accountability scores and others to lower accountability scores.
They ﬁnd that teachers are more likely to leave schools that have been downwardly shocked
and less likely to leave schools that have been upwardly shocked. Dizon-Ross (2014) goes one
step further and also study joining teachers' quality. She ﬁnds that a lower accountability
grade among schools at the bottom end of the school grade distribution decreases teacher
turnover among high-quality teachers and increases joining teachers' quality, whereas a lower
accountability grade among schools at the top end of the school grade distribution has no
turnover eﬀect, but decreases joining teachers' quality.
We follow up the analysis of Feng et al. (2011) and Dizon-Ross (2014) by studying the eﬀect
of accountability on teacher composition. More speciﬁcally, we study if the ability distribution
of the teachers changes as a consequence of the reform. Teacher ability is in the following based
on teachers' academic performance in higher education. Several scholars provide evidence of
4There are some papers on school accountability and the mobility of school principals. E.g., Li (2012)
ﬁnds that No Child Left Behind induced more able principals to move to schools less likely to face sanctions,
thereby decreasing the average principal quality at schools serving disadvantage students. In addition, there
are a few papers on school accountability and pupil sorting. E.g., Burgess et al. (2013) ﬁnd indications of
student sorting when school accountability was combined with school choice.
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a positive inﬂuence of teacher' academic achievement on student achievement, and hence that
teachers' own grades from higher education is a proxy for teacher quality (e.g., Hanushek et al.,
2014; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006; Clotfelter et al., 2006 and 2007). In addition, teachers' own
academic achievement is a good indicator regarding teachers' outside options as teachers own
grades are salient for potential future employers. In contrast to Feng et. al. (2010) and Dizon-
Ross (2014), we study the reactions to the introduction of an accountability system instead
of reactions within an already existing one. Furthermore, we disentangle teacher responses to
two accountability regimes, one internal and one external, and study how they trigger teacher
turnover and sorting. Although not able to make causal inference, we also discuss if a potential
gain in student achievement is related to changed behavior of the incumbent workforce or to
changes in the ability composition of teachers.
The performance indicator is salient in an accountability system. The performance in-
dicator embedded in the nested school accountability reform was based on student grades.
The lack of grading in primary education created a higher reform intensity in lower secondary
than in primary education. We exploit this diﬀerence in reform intensity in a diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences (DD)-approach. For the general policy environment and the composition of
students to be similar in the treatment and comparison groups, we compare lower secondary
school teachers to primary school teachers in Oslo, before and after the reform was introduced.
To ensure that any results are not driven by systematic diﬀerences between lower secondary
and primary school teachers, we add a third diﬀerence: We compare the diﬀerence between
treated teachers in lower secondary education and untreated teachers in primary education in
the reform district to the diﬀerence between lower secondary and primary school teachers in
school districts not aﬀected by the reform in a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences (DDD)-
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approach. We use rich Norwegian data on public school teachers to study causal eﬀects of
school accountability on teacher turnover and sorting.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcantly increased teacher mobility after the internal part of the reform. The
external part of the reform also triggers teacher turnover in lower secondary education, but
not to a larger extent than the internal part. Almost all non-stayers leave the teaching sector
entirely. High-ability teachers respond more strongly in terms of teacher mobility than low-
ability teachers. Nevertheless, we identify a positive sorting eﬀect after the external part
of the reform, indicating that high-ability teachers who quit are being replaced by other
high-ability teachers. We ﬁnd a small positive relationship between student achievement and
school accountability after the external part of the reform, which is coherent with the pattern
of teacher sorting.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the institutional setting and the reform
details. The empirical strategy is outlined in section 3. Section 4 presents the data, deﬁnes
important variables in the analysis, and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents
the empirical results and robustness tests regarding teacher mobility and sorting. Section 6
oﬀers a discussion on how sorting and incentive eﬀects may contribute to student achievement.
Section 7 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
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2 Institutional setting and the accountability reform
2.1 The Norwegian educational system
The educational system in Norway is based on public schools, in which more than 95% of
the students are enrolled. Public schools have a common curriculum and the same number
of teaching hours in each subject. They are organized in school districts and each district is
in charge of their own school policies. Oslo, the reform district, has proved to be an active
policy maker. For instance, teachers in Oslo are hired by the school they work at, which is not
the case for all school districts in Norway. Whereas the governance structure can vary across
districts, it is similar for primary and lower secondary school teachers within school districts.
The desirability of retaining and ﬁring teachers may change as schools become more re-
sponsible for their performance. In Norway, the teacher labor market is strictly regulated,
making it diﬃcult to lay oﬀ teachers who have permanent positions. In addition, wage bar-
gaining is centralized. There is little variation in wages across teaching jobs, and wages are
diﬃcult to use as a means of retaining teachers. In such an environment, mobility within the
school sector will primarily be motivated by non-wage job attributes, as found by Falch and
Strøm (2005).
Alternative wages are important in explaining out of sector mobility (Dolton and van der
Klaauw, 1995, 1999; Hoxby and Leigh, 2004). Chingos and West (2012) ﬁnd that teachers with
high value added have higher earnings compared to other teachers after leaving the teaching
sector. In Norway, the wage structure is compressed and the returns to education are generally
low, particular in the public sector (Barth and Moene, 2000). In terms of wages, teachers'
external labor market is similar to the teacher labor market at least within the public sector.
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As regards the student body, schools take in students based on their catchment areas.
The compulsory education track, composed of primary and lower secondary education, starts
at age 6 and continues until the age of 16. In contrast to many other countries, students in
Norway are not graded before entering lower secondary education at the age of 13. In primary
education, the evaluation of students is based on low-stakes tests only. There is no objective
measure of school performance in primary education in the time period analyzed. Students
in lower secondary education, on the other hand, are graded by their teachers in a total of
ten subjects. In addition, students sit for one central exit exam.5 Grades from the last year
of compulsory education are used to compete for study seats in upper secondary education,
making them high stakes for the students.
2.2 The nested accountability reform
An emphasis on school performance was gradually implemented in Oslo. In 2002, there was
a major reorganization in which school principals were granted substantive impact on school
policies and hence assigned an important role in the process of generating educational success.
In 2003 (i.e., the internal part of the reform), school principals became accountable to
the school district authority for student achievement. Individual meetings at which school
performance was discussed were arranged annually between the authority and each school
principal. School performance was based on student achievement. In lower secondary edu-
cation, student grades (both teacher-awarded grades and central exam scores) were salient
in this respect. Student grades are easily interpretable to both teachers, principals, and the
5Students are randomly assigned to one examination among four subjects: Norwegian I and II, English
and mathematics.
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school district authority. In the case of low performance, school principals had to commit to
changes in order to increase performance later on.
In 2005 (i.e., the external part of the reform), a market element was added to the account-
ability regime. First, a new adjusted school quality indicator was calculated for schools in
lower secondary education, which aimed at indicating each school's contribution to student
achievement, i.e., the value added. The indicator was based on mean grade points from both
teacher-awarded grades and central exams, and it was adjusted for individual student and
parental characteristics (Hægeland et al., 2004). By relaying on student grades that are high
stakes for students in contrast to accountability tests, the scope for gaming by teachers was
reduced. Adjusting the school quality indicator and including centrally graded exam scores
also made artiﬁcially inﬂating student achievement more diﬃcult.
Second, the school quality indicator was publicly disclosed for the ﬁrst and only time
on November 18th. The aim was to inform parents and other stakeholders, and to further
induce teachers to focus on school performance. At the time of the publication, both school
principals and the public were told that there would not be any further public disclosures
of school quality indicators. After the 2005 general election, the new government strongly
opposed public disclosure of school performance. Hence, the threat of further exposure for
teachers in lower secondary education in Oslo was no longer imminent.
In 2006, a national reform implemented accountability mechanisms in all school districts,
thereby aligning the system in Oslo with other school districts. In addition, a new performance
measure with written assessments was implemented in primary schools in Oslo from 2006.
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2.3 What to expect of the nested accountability reform?
Neither the internal nor the external part of the reform were so-called high-stakes account-
ability regimes. Both were low-powered as no rewards or sanctions - such as threats of ﬁring
teachers, replacement of principals, or reconstitution of schools - were attached. Whereas
these elements are often regarded as necessary to change teacher behavior, Figlio and Loeb
(2011) suggest that even accountability systems absent of strong sanctions or rewards will
aﬀect the teaching environment and impact student achievement. In fact, increased focus on
school performance and creating a new focal point can in itself be eﬀort enhancing6
The internal part of the reform initiated a new way for school principals and teachers to
govern and conduct schools. School principals were made responsible for student achievement
towards the school district authority, and teachers were the main channel through which
they could fuel student achievement. School principals were therefore induced to inform and
motivate teachers in parallel with delegating more responsibility and making teachers more
accountable for student achievement. Furthermore, the incentive embedded in the external
part of the reform was more high-powered. The ranking of schools based on adjusted student
grades, which could be interpreted as school value added, was made public. This external
mechanism was added to the internal part of the reform and could have provided enhanced
incentives for teacher to increase student achievement.7
School accountability may, however, not function as an incentive for incumbent teachers
6In a theoretical setting, Dewatripont et al. (1999), by extending the one-task career concerns model
of Holmström (1982), ﬁnd that total eﬀort goes up when the number of tasks an individual has to perform
decreases. The rationale behind this result is that accountability increases with the clarity of an organization's
mission. In contrast, when an organization practices a fuzzy mission the market is uncertain about which
mission an individual is actually pursuing, inducing lower career concerns, eﬀort and performance.
7Carnoy and Loeb (2002) ﬁnd a positive and signiﬁcant relationship between the strength of states' ac-
countability systems and achievement gains.
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to increase their eﬀort. As mentioned in the introduction, teachers might ﬁnd the conditions
under which they operate inadequate: Many elements inﬂuencing student achievement are out
of their control. Accountability may also crowd out teachers' intrinsic motivation, and may
lead to a shift in focus from student learning to testing. The performance-contract between
schools and the school district authority is also likely to have induced a higher administrative
workload for teachers in Oslo compared to in other parts of the country. Hence, the nested
school accountability reform may trigger teacher mobility.
Diﬀerent teacher types may react diﬀerently to school accountability. Whereas high-quality
teachers are considered to embody the necessary skills in order to respond to the new regime
and therefore are more likely to stay than low ability teachers, they might ﬁnd it hard to
increase the overall school performance and may become demotivated, and hence leave. In
addition, high-quality teachers, as measured in terms of teachers' academic achievement, may
have better outside options compared to low quality teachers as potential future employers
value applicants with strong academic records.
Dohmen and Falk (2010) ﬁnd that introducing performance pay for teachers may crowd in
teachers who are less trusting and more negatively reciprocal, at the cost of the current proﬁle.
As a consequence, the composition of teachers might negatively change and have an adverse
eﬀect on students' educational progress. A low-stakes accountability system is likely to yield
diﬀerent results. The incentives inherent in the accountability regime studied in this paper
might be more suitable for teachers than the individualized and explicit incentive studied by
Dohmen and Falk (ibid.).8
8Individual performance pay can be an adequate incentive for teachers (e.g., Lavy, 2009). Lavy (2015) even
ﬁnds that teachers' pay for performance has positive long run eﬀects on students' educational and labor market
outcomes. Barley and Neal (2012) propose an incentive scheme for educators that rely on ordinal information
contained in assessment results. They claim that such a scheme will reduce the gaming behavior of teachers
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3 Empirical strategy
3.1 Teacher mobility
To estimate what we can interpret as a causal eﬀect on teacher mobility by the reform, we
need to control for two kinds of potentially confounding trends: Changes in teacher mobility
over time that have nothing to do with the nested reform, and diﬀerences in teacher mobility
between teachers at the diﬀerent school levels. We employ a DD-framework to estimate the
eﬀect of the accountability reform on teacher mobility.
The existence of grading in lower secondary in contrast to in primary schools result in
lower secondary being aﬀected and primary schools not aﬀected by the reform. We exploit
this diﬀerence in accountability pressure by using lower secondary education as treatment
group and primary education schools as comparison group.
The school districts are in charge of school policies, and Oslo has proved to be an active
policy maker. For the general policy environment to be similar in the treatment and compar-
ison groups, we only include schools from the same school district. Moreover, primary and
lower secondary schools in Oslo share the same student population, which could be a factor
impacting teacher turnover.
The following DD-equation is estimated:
yist = βo + β1Es + dt + γ1(Esd
T
t ) + β2Xit + εist (1)
as these schemes are more adequate than those relying on cardinal rankings. In general though, output-based
incentives for teachers are often suggested to be low-powered in order to avoid gaming as high-powered explicit
incentives are best used when output is well deﬁned, the eﬀort-performance relation is well understood, the
production is uni-dimensional, and the outcome is easily measured (Dixit, 2002; Lazear, 2003).
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The outcome variable yist is a dummy for whether teacher i who works at school s quits
the job in year t or not. βo is a constant. Es is a dummy variable that equals one if s is a
lower secondary school and zero if a primary school, i.e., the comparison group. dt is a set of
year dummies covering the period before, during and after the nested accountability reform
(i.e., 2000-2006). dTt is a dummy variable equal to one if a reform year (i.e., 2004-2005 or
2006) or zero otherwise. Xit is a vector of covariates that include gender, age, experience,
controls for yearly local labor market conditions by educational background, a dummy for
working in primary or lower secondary education, teacher education level, and dummies for
having a teacher education at bachelor's and master's level. Age and experience are included
as a quadratic functions. εist is a random error term clustered on school level to safeguard
against the possibility that the error term can be correlated within schools.9 Our parameter
of interest in Equation 1 is γ1. This parameter, in which the reform year dummy is interacted
with treatment group status, measures the change in teacher turnover in the reform years
relative to the years before the reform.
Quit decisions are made each year, so we also estimate a more general equation than
Equation 1. Instead of an average reform eﬀect, pooled over all reform years we replace the
DD-parameter, γ1, with a vector of year speciﬁc parameters. Both speciﬁcations allow us to
study the mobility responses to the internal (2004-2005) reform and the additional external
element in 2006.
That the same reform leads to diﬀerent accountability pressure in primary and lower sec-
ondary schools is a hypothesis that is important for identiﬁcation. Grades in lower secondary
9To avoid a potential bias from too few clusters, we never have fewer than 42 clusters in any of our
regressions. See Angrist and Pischke (2008).
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education, salient to the diﬀerence in accountability pressure, are easily interpretable and the
learning objectives for the them are clearly stated. Grades in lower secondary education are
given for each grade level and in all subjects. In contrast, tests in primary education are
low stakes, and evaluations of students are neither easily interpretable nor comparable across
classrooms. If the hypothesis does not hold, and primary school teachers are aﬀected in the
same way in spite of the institutional diﬀerences, any eﬀects must be a result of other factors
inﬂuencing the diﬀerence between primary and lower secondary school in Oslo. On the other
hand, if primary and lower secondary school teachers are similarly aﬀected by the reform, but
react opposite, we will overestimate the eﬀect of the reform.
There are concerns with the DD-approach. Systematic diﬀerences in educational traits for
primary and lower secondary school teachers could imply that common shocks in the labor
market aﬀect the two groups of teachers diﬀerently. If that is the case, the estimated eﬀect
using Equation 1 is not necessarily an eﬀect of the reform, but could be an eﬀect of diﬀerent
reactions to labor market conditions in primary and lower secondary education.
Systematic diﬀerences between primary and lower secondary school teachers should be
similar across school districts. There might be a diﬀerence in how shocks aﬀect primary
and lower secondary school teachers, but the diﬀerence should be similar inside and outside
the reform district. To safeguard that the estimated reform eﬀect is not caused by diﬀerent
reactions to the same shocks, we compare the diﬀerence between lower secondary and primary
school teachers in the reform district to the same diﬀerence in the rest of the country before
and after the reform.
By adding a third diﬀerence between teachers inside and outside the reform school district,
any within-school level diﬀerences, e.g., systematic diﬀerences in educational traits, are netted
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out. Diﬀerences in the labor market situation across school districts are still accounted for by
the fact that primary and lower secondary education teachers are situated in the same labor
market area.
In the DDD-framework, the following equation is estimated:
yist = βo + β1Ts + β2Es + dt + dtEs + dtTs + γ1(TsEs) + γ2(TsEsd
T
t ) + β3Xit + εist (2)
Our parameter of interest from Equation 2 is γ2. This parameter measures the change in
teacher turnover in the reform years in the diﬀerence between turnover for lower secondary
school teachers and primary school teachers inside and outside the reform district. Ts is a
dummy that equals one if school s is situated in the reform district and zero if situated outside
of the reform district.
There might still be concerns with the DDD-approach. If the reform led to strategic moving
by parents, large changes in moving patterns could have led to changed student composition
in schools, which again could aﬀect teacher mobility. Fiva and Kirkebøen (2011) ﬁnd an
increase in housing prices near high-quality schools in Oslo as a consequence of the second
part of the reform, indicating strategic movings. However, the eﬀect was short-lived, and thus
could not have led to large changes in the student composition. That our eﬀect is driven by
compositional changes due to the second part of the reform is therefore unlikely.
In general, there are indications of student composition inﬂuencing teachers' mobility deci-
sions (e.g., Lankford et al., 2002; Hanushek et al., 1999; Falch and Strøm, 2005). We therefore
perform robustness tests to test whether changes in school characteristics over time drive our
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results by excluding small schools and schools with a high immigrant share.
The labor market for teachers could be systematically diﬀerent in large cities and more rural
areas. We test whether the results are robust to only including large cities in the comparison
group. Another concern is that the treated school district is a diﬀerent labor market district
from also the other large cities. However, the surrounding municipalities share the same labor
market, so we include municipalities surrounding the treated school district as a comparison
group in another robustness test.
Changes in the accountability regime could lead to sorting within the school sector, i.e.,
that teachers move to schools with higher performance or outside the treated school district.
To ﬁnd out whether changes in the turnover is a result of within-sector sorting, we estimate
Equation 2 with the outcome of leaving the teaching sector.
There could be heterogeneous responses to the accountability reform, which can induce
teacher sorting eﬀects. We estimate Equation 2 separately for teachers with academic achieve-
ment above and below mean separately. We also estimate Equation 2 separately according to
gender, educational background, age and experience.
The main underlying assumption in a DD- and DDD-approach is the existence of a common
trend before the reform. We check whether such an assumption holds both by graphical
examination and a placebo test.
3.2 Teacher sorting
The overall eﬀect on teacher composition depends not only on who leave, but also on the
teachers replacing the ones who leave. To ﬁnd out if there is a sorting eﬀect of the nested
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school accountability reform, we estimate the eﬀect on the mean academic achievement of the
teacher stock in schools. Systematic diﬀerences in teacher composition between primary and
lower secondary education might be a larger concern when studying outcomes at the school
level. We therefore use a similar empirical approach as in Equation 2, but with mean academic
achievement within the school as the outcome:
yst = βo + β1Ts + β2Es + dt + dtEs + dtTs + γ1(TsEs) + γ2(TsEsd
T
t ) + β3Xst + εst (3)
The outcome yst measures mean academic achievement of the teacher stock at time t for
school s. All explanatory variables have the same interpretation as in Equation 2, with the
exception of Xst, which now denotes a vector of control variables at the school level, including
mean age, mean educational level, mean years experience, and male share. Our variable of
interest is still γ2.
Several authors provide evidence of a positive inﬂuence of teachers' academic achievement
on student achievement and hence that teachers' own grades from higher education is a proxy
for teacher quality (e.g., Hanushek et al., 2014; Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006; Clotfelter et al.,
2006 and 2007). Teachers with strong academic records are not always the same as those
who actually boost student achievement, but when analyzing teacher mobility, teachers' own
academic achievement is a good indicator for teachers' outside options as teachers own grades
signals ability to future employers. We also check how composition in terms of male share,
experience, age and teacher educational background is aﬀected by the reform.
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4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use rich register data on public school teachers from Statistics Norway to study teacher
turnover and sorting in Norway in the period between 2000 and 2006. Employment data on
teachers includes information on gender, age, education, employment code, and experience
(measured as years spent at the school). The employment data does not only cover a yearly
reference week, but every 4 weeks during the year. The data source contains school identiﬁers
and personal identiﬁcation codes for each teacher. Since teacher mobility can be inﬂuenced by
local labor market conditions we add yearly data on local unemployment by education level.
The sample is restricted to teachers eligible for permanent appointments. Non-certiﬁed
teachers are not eligible for permanent positions, and are subject to involuntary moves. We
therefore restrict the sample to teachers who either have a teacher education, or a teacher
employment code. We also restrict the sample to those who work more than 50 percent of
full-time. The pension age in Norway is 62 for most teachers, and we do not want to include
those who leave the profession due to age. Therefore, only teachers between the ages of 20
and 60 are included in the sample for each year. Moreover, some schools in Norway are
combined primary and lower secondary schools. We are not able to identify whether teachers
at combined schools work in primary or lower secondary education, and combined schools are
therefore excluded. Schools that were closed down during the period are also excluded from
our sample, which is only relevant in the comparison group in the estimation period.
We add micro data on teacher academic achievement. To construct an ability index, we
use teachers' own grades from higher education institutions (HEI), that is, all universities and
university colleges in Norway. A range of diﬀerent grading scales is used for grades included
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in the sample.10 We normalize every grade within each grading scale and year, and calculate
the mean grade for each person, using all grades except for pass/fail.11 The ability index
is adjusted for institution- and ﬁeld-speciﬁc eﬀects. Even if it is a strength that HEI use
external examiners from other institutions, grading practices can still vary across HEI and
study ﬁelds. Also other teacher characteristics may contribute to student achievement, e.g.,
teacher eﬀort, personal traits, and teaching practices. Nevertheless, our ability index is a
good indicator for teachers' outside options as teachers' own grades signals ability to future
employers. To control for teachers' academic achievement, we include a dummy for having
academic achievement above average.
The sample includes 22 196 observations in Oslo, and 278 909 observations in total for 64
306 teachers for the years 2000-2006. Table A.1 in the Appendix gives a descriptive overview
of the main variables used in the analysis, for the total sample and for the treatment and
comparison groups separately. As regards data on teachers' performance in higher education,
we have information about at least one grade for 48 792 teachers in the sample.
The outcome variable in the mobility analysis is to leave the school, which is deﬁned as not
being registered as employed in the same school during the next calendar year. Persons who
have an end to their employment spell in a speciﬁc school during a year will not be registered
as employed in the next year, and are thus making a transition. The exception is if they quit
the job, but return to the school so that they are registered as employed in the school the
next year. In that case, they will not be registered as making a transition by our deﬁnition.
Most teacher mobility takes place during summer. For teachers who are employed at several
10A national grading system in HEI was ﬁrst implemented in 2003.
1160 percent of all grades included in the sample are obtained by teachers with exams in educational science.
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Figure 1: Teacher Turnover in Lower Secondary and Primary Education
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schools at the same time, we chose what we deﬁne as the main employer (highest number
of working hours and highest seniority). To leave the school thus includes changing jobs to
other teaching jobs both inside and outside the treatment area, or leaving the sector entirely.
Making schools accountable for student achievement to the school district authority in 2003,
and publicly distributing new information about school quality in November 2005, are most
likely to inﬂuence teacher turnover from 2004 and 2006, respectively.12
The critical assumption for both the DD- and DDD-approach is that in the absence of the
nested reform, the diﬀerence between lower secondary and primary school teachers follow a
similar trend. The ﬁrst part in Figure 1 indicates a common pre-treatment trend in Oslo, the
treatment area. The third part in Figure 1, which shows the diﬀerence in mobility responses
between lower secondary and primary education teachers in the treatment and comparison
areas, suggests that there is also a common trend in the diﬀerence between lower secondary
and primary school teachers before the reform. In the pre-treatment period, teacher turnover
in primary education is higher than teacher turnover in lower secondary education. That
changes, however, in the treatment period. For the comparison group (see second part in
12Teachers were not informed long before the implementation of each reform, i.e., teachers could not adjust
their mobility responses ex ante, only ex post.
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Figure 1), there is no such shift. These ﬁgures thus provide the ﬁrst indication that the nested
school accountability reform impacts lower secondary and primary teachers in the reform
district diﬀerently.
As suggested in Section 3.1, there are no parallel pre-trend when comparing lower secondary
school teachers' mobility in Oslo to the rest of the country (see part one and two in Figure 1).
This, however, is not a threat to our DD- and DDD-estimators as we exploit the diﬀerences
between lower secondary and primary school teachers.
There is a spike in teacher mobility in 2003 for both teacher groups in both areas, as
seen in Figure 1, indicating that national events aﬀected both the treatment and comparison
groups. Such events could be the surprisingly low performance on the PISA-test or business
cycle conditions.13 Teacher unemployment reached a peak in 2003, which is coherent with the
peak we ﬁnd in our data. Tighter budget constraints at the school district level are the main
reason for the high teacher unemployment in 2003. Neither of these events should inﬂuence our
DD- and DDD-estimates, since it is unlikely that they would inﬂuence the diﬀerence between
teacher mobility in lower secondary schools and primary schools in Oslo, and unlikely that
they would inﬂuence the same diﬀerence in other parts of the country.
Our main analysis ends in 2006 when the accountability regime in our comparison group
changes. As a part of the robustness tests, long-term eﬀects are also analyzed by adding
data to 2008. With higher accountability intensity in primary education in Oslo, and the
introduction of accountability regimes in the rest of the country, an increase in mobility in all
parts of our comparison group could be expected after 2006.
13During the period studied, Norway participated in PISA in 2000, 2003, and 2006. Norway performed
badly on the ﬁrst PISA-test, and this is often referred to as the PISA-shock.
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The data used in the sorting analysis are aggregated to school level. We calculate mean
academic achievement of teachers within schools, which is our primary outcome variable in
the sorting analysis. Positive sorting in terms of mean teacher ability implies that schools are
able to attract and/or replace their high-ability teachers. For this analysis, we have 13 495
observations from 2360 schools.
We use data on student achievement to discuss sorting and incentive eﬀects on student
achievement in Section 6. In Norway, data on teachers' evaluations and central exam scores
for 10th grade have been collected from 2002. Included are student grades in all subjects for
the last year of lower secondary education.14 In total, we have information on grades and
social background variables for 278 223 students for the years 2002-2008.
5 Results
5.1 Teacher mobility
Table 1 shows the results from the DD-analysis based on Equation 1. Column 1 shows the
average eﬀect pooled over reform years while column 2 and 3 show year speciﬁc eﬀects. In
column 3, control variables for teacher background are added.
Column 1 reveals a substantial eﬀect of the reform on teacher mobility. We estimate a
7.7 percentage points increase in teacher mobility after the ﬁrst part of the reform and a 8.9
percentage points increase after the second part, from a pre-reform level of around 10 percent
(see Table A.1). Column 2 shows that the reform eﬀect is the smallest in the ﬁrst year,
with an estimate of 6.7 percentage points, before it increases with about 2 percentage points
14Test scores on national tests for primary and lower secondary education are only available from 2007.
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Table 1: The Eﬀect of Accountability on Teacher Mobility, DD-speciﬁcation
Pooled reform eﬀect Reform eﬀect by year Reform eﬀect by year with controls
Lower Secondary -0.062 (0.008)*** -0.062 (0.008)*** -0.037*** 0.009)
Oslo*Lower Secondary*(2004-2005) 0.077 (0.013)***
Oslo*Lower Secondary*2004 0.067 (0.015)*** 0.045 (0.013)***
Oslo*Lower Secondary*2005 0.088 (0.017)*** 0.064 (0.016)***
Oslo*Lower Secondary*2006 0.089 (0.022)*** 0.089 (0.022)*** 0.066 (0.019)***
R-squared 0.013 0.013 0.202
Number of observations 22 196 22 196 22 196
Note: All speciﬁcations are estimated by OLS and include a constant term, year dummies (ref. 2000), and the
interaction terms (Es ∗ dt). Standard errors are clustered on school level. */**/*** statistically signiﬁcant at
the 10/5/1 percent level.
from 2005. The external reform element added in 2005 does not lead to a further increase
in the 2006-eﬀect. Publicly disclosing school performance seems therefore, on average, not to
alter the mobility response of lower secondary school teachers relative to the response already
emanating from the internal part of the reform. Adding controls for teacher background
decreases the magnitude of the eﬀect, although the pattern is similar. Column 3 reveals a
reform eﬀect of 4.5 percentage points the ﬁrst year, before it increases to about 6.5 percentage
points in the subsequent years.
As lower secondary school teachers have diﬀerent characteristics, and thus may be exposed
to diﬀerent shocks, we add a third diﬀerence; between the school district of Oslo and other
school districts. Column 1 in Table 2 reports estimated results based on Equation 2, whereas
Columns 2 and 3 report year speciﬁc eﬀects. Control variables for teacher background are
added in Column 3.
Column 1 shows an average treatment eﬀect of 7 percentage points after the internal part
of the reform, and the same eﬀect is found for the external part of the reform. Decomposing
the average treatment eﬀect of the 2003 reform (calculated for the period 2004-2005) into
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Table 2: The Eﬀect of Accountability on Teacher Mobility, DDD-speciﬁcation
Pooled reform eﬀect Reform eﬀect by year Reform eﬀect by year with controls
Oslo 0.026 (0.004)*** 0.026 (0.004)*** 0.017 (0.004)***
Lower Secondary, Oslo -0.037 (0.002)*** -0.037 (0.002)*** -0.020 (0.002)***
Lower Secondary -0.011 (0.005)** -0.011 (0.005)** -0.015 (0.004)***
Oslo*Lower Secondary*(2004-2005) 0.071 (0.004)***
Oslo*Lower Secondary*2004 0.065 (0.004)*** 0.052 (0.004)***
Oslo*Lower Secondary*2005 0.077 (0.005)*** 0.066 (0.005)***
Oslo*Lower Secondary*2006 0.075 (0.005)*** 0.075 (0.005)*** 0.063 (0.005)***
R-squared 0.006 0.006 0.179
Number of observations 278 909 278 909 278 909
Note: All speciﬁcations are estimated by OLS and include a constant term, year dummies (ref. 2000), and the
interaction terms (Ts ∗ dt) and (Es ∗ dt). The third speciﬁcation is used in all subsequent tables. Standard
errors are clustered on school level. */**/*** statistically signiﬁcant at the 10/5/1 percent level.
year-speciﬁc eﬀects in Column 2 and 3 reveal the same picture as before: The reform eﬀect is
the smallest in the ﬁrst year, then increases in 2005, and remains the same in 2006.
The results in Table 1 and 2 are quantitatively the same. The estimates are somewhat
higher in column 1 and 2 in the DDD-analysis than for the DD-analysis, but when adding
controls for teachers' educational background in column 3, the results from the two models are
aligned. The similarity of the results in the two models leads to the conclusion that primary
and lower secondary school teachers are not exposed to diﬀerent shocks. However, there are
compositional eﬀects that lead the results in column 2 and 3 to be diﬀerent in the DD-analysis.
The DDD-analysis are less sensitive to such a concern. In the following analysis, we thus keep
the DDD-framework and the third speciﬁcation with teacher controls.
Individuals may respond diﬀerently to incentives (e.g., Leuven et al., 2010; Bettinger,
2010; Angrist et al., 2009; Angrist and Lavy, 2009). Heterogeneity in terms of mobility may
also have implications for teacher sorting, i.e., the net impact of teacher outﬂow and inﬂow.
We therefore compliment the analysis by studying heterogeneous mobility eﬀects, see Table
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3. We ﬁnd that high-ability teachers are more responsive to the reform than low-ability
teachers. More precisely, teachers with strong academic records react stronger than those
with academic achievement below average in 2004 and 2006. In 2005, there is no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the mobility response for the two groups.15 The diﬀerence in the 2006-eﬀect is
substantial considering that the baseline mobility is similar for high- and low-ability teachers.
Regarding the stronger reaction in the high-ability group, an important reason may be that
those with higher academic achievements also have better labor market prospects as academic
achievement serves as a signal of ability. The sample is reduced when estimating the eﬀect
by ability group as we do not have information on academic achievement for all teachers.
However, the reduction of the sample does not change the results when estimating Equation
2. Other studies have also found that teachers with high academic achievements more often
leave the teaching profession than teachers with lower scores, although not as a consequence
of school accountability (Murnane and Olsen, 1990; Henke et al., 2000; Podgusrsky et al.,
2004; Boyd et al., 2011).16
For other subgroups, the heterogeneous eﬀects are as follows: Teachers with relatively short
experience (less than 4 years at the same school) react stronger to the reform than their more
experienced colleges. Younger teachers (below 40) respond more strongly to public exposure
than their older counterparts as younger teachers change jobs to a signiﬁcantly greater extent
than older teachers after the external part of the reform. Mobility response is somewhat higher
for men than women, although the diﬀerence between male and female teachers' responses is
15To check whether the diﬀerences between the subgroup pairs' DDD-estimates are statistically signiﬁcant
we test the linear combination of two estimates.
16We also analyze the eﬀect of new information concerning school performance on teacher mobility. We
compare the ranking of schools based on the adjusted and the non-adjusted performance indicator related to
the external part of the reform. We ﬁnd reduced mobility among low-ability teachers in schools receiving a
negative information shock, while for high-ability teachers in the same schools the mobility increases.
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Table 3: Heterogeneous Treatment Eﬀects, Teacher Mobility
male female young old
Oslo*Lower Secondary
*2004 0.064 (0.005)*** 0.048 (0.005)*** 0.052 (0.007)*** 0.050 (0.004)***
*2005 0.101 (0.007)*** 0.050 (0.005)*** 0.055 (0.008)*** 0.069 (0.005)***
*2006 0.064 (0.007)*** 0.053 (0.005)*** 0.078 (0.008)*** 0.046 (0.005)***
R-squared 0.220 0.204 0.234 0.160
Number of observations 79 372 199 537 90 278 188 631
Baseline mobility 10.83 11.52 15.75 7.88
long experience short experience Teacher Education general education
Oslo*Lower Secondary
*2004 0.039 (0.004)*** 0.114 (0.016)*** 0.043 (0.004)*** 0.003 (0.012)
*2005 0.058 (0.004)*** 0.087 (0.016)*** 0.050 (0.005)*** 0.034 (0.012)***
*2006 0.042 (0.004)*** 0.127 (0.017)*** 0.037 (0.005)*** 0.040 (0.013)***
R-squared 0.060 0.054 0.202 0.272
Number of observations 232 036 46 873 250 316 28 593
Baseline mobility 2.42 24.12 12.63 9.40
high academic achievement low academic achievement
Oslo*Lower Secondary
*2004 0.074 (0.006)*** 0.039 (0.006)***
*2005 0.061 (0.007)*** 0.057 (0.006)***
*2006 0.097 (0.007)*** 0.032 (0.006)***
R-squared 0.197 0.235
Number of observations 106 530 99 306
Baseline mobility 11.04 12.72
Note: See Table 2
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only signiﬁcant in 2005. Teachers with a designated teaching degree have a stronger mobility
response than teachers with a general education in 2004.
5.1.1 Out of sector mobility
So far, we have studied whether lower secondary school teachers change workplaces or not.
An alternative outcome is the extent to which lower secondary school teachers leave the
sector entirely. That is, do lower secondary school teachers move into other teaching jobs,
and strategically move in or out of the treatment group, or do they leave the school sector
entirely? Table A.2 shows that most of those who change jobs actually leave the teaching
profession.17 The same mobility eﬀects (results not shown) are found for out of sector mobility
as for the main outcome variable, change in workplace. In contrast to previous studies, we
do not ﬁnd that those who leave the teaching profession often leave employment altogether
(Stinebrickner, 2002; Fritjers et al., 2004). Few go to better paid jobs, which is coherent with
non-wage attributes driving teacher mobility as discussed in Section 2.1.
5.2 Robustness checks
5.2.1 Placebo and alternative comparison groups
We conduct several robustness checks to investigate the sensitivity of our ﬁndings. First,
we perform a placebo test. Based on Equation 2, we test for plausible reform eﬀects in the
years before the nested accountability reform. Reform eﬀects should not be found before the
implementation of the nested accountability reform if there exist a common trend. Table
4 shows the year-speciﬁc eﬀects for lower secondary education in Oslo before, during and
17There are too few observations to study other transitions, such as mobility in or out of treatment.
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after the implementation of the nested accountability reform. The DDD-estimates are indeed
insigniﬁcant in the pre-treatment years 2001, 2002 and 2003. The diﬀerence between lower
secondary and primary education teachers in Oslo and the rest of the country thus have a
common trend before the implementation of the reform.
Table 4: Placebo Test, Teacher Mobility
Speciﬁcation (3)
Treatment Eﬀect (ref. 2000)
2001 0.003 (0.006)
2002 0.003 (0.006)
2003 -0.004 (0.006)
2004 0.052 (0.006)***
2005 0.063 (0.007)***
2006 0.059 (0.006)***
R-squared 0.207
Number of observations 278 909
Note: See Table 2
To investigate further whether the results are sensitive to the choice of comparison group,
we ﬁrst exclude small schools (less than 20 persons in full-time positions per school) as a
robustness check as there are few small schools in the treatment group. This does not change
our DDD-estimates. Neither does excluding schools with high immigrant share, which are
concentrated in the treatment area.
It might still be a concern that the labor market for teachers in lower secondary education is
diﬀerent than for teachers in primary education, and that there are diﬀerences in labor market
conditions in Oslo compared to the rest of the country. We therefore change the comparison
group to ﬁrst only include school districts around Oslo, which are part of the same labor
market region, and then to only include the main cities in Norway, which might have similar
and, on average, better pools of applicants. None of these changes in the comparison group
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Figure 2: Long Term Transition Rates
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inﬂuence our DDD-estimates (results not shown).
5.2.2 Long-term eﬀects
No long-term eﬀects (for the years 2007-2008) on teacher mobility of the nested accountability
reform are found in lower secondary education in Oslo. The eﬀect fades out in 2007 and is
non-existent in 2008 (results not shown). Figure 2 shows that the transition rate for teachers
in lower secondary education in the reform district decreases after 2006, while it rises for
teachers in primary education in the reform district. Written performance assessments were
introduced for primary schools in Oslo in 2006, thus increasing accountability intensity for
these teachers. An increase in transition rates is also observed in the comparison area post
2006, which could be expected as a consequence of the national 2006 school reform. From
2006, there is an alignment of accountability systems across the country, which is coherent
with the pattern for teacher turnover. In this case, the lack of long-term eﬀects strengthens
our argument that school accountability does in fact increase teacher mobility.
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5.3 Teacher sorting
Which types of teachers sort into schools under school accountability? The previous analysis
were concerned with the outﬂow of teachers, and notably teacher turnover among high-ability
teachers. We now study changes in the ability distribution of the stock of teachers at the
school level. By estimating the DDD-eﬀect using Equation 3, we disclose if there are any
sorting eﬀects.
The mean teacher ability increases in the reform schools in 2005 (not statistically sig-
niﬁcant) and 2006 (statistically signiﬁcant), as seen in Table 5. The positive 2006-eﬀect on
mean teacher ability amounts to 3.6 percent of a standard deviation within a school. This
means that even though the nested school accountability reform does not encourage the right
pattern of retention as seen in Section 5.1, lower secondary schools in Oslo are able to attract
high-ability teachers.
Large cities face a diﬀerent pool of potential applicants for available teacher positions than
the rest of the country. Sorting may thus be diﬀerent in the large cities than in the rest of
the country, so we repeat the analysis only with the main cities including areas around these
cities as comparison group. Reassuringly, we ﬁnd similar results as when using the rest of the
country as comparison group. When performing placebo tests, no signiﬁcant eﬀects are found
for the pre-reform years (results not shown).
Also schools performing below average are able to attract high-quality teachers. Other
studies ﬁnd adverse eﬀects on teacher turnover in low-performing schools (e.g., Clotfelter et
al., 2004) and adverse eﬀects on school principal mobility in low-performing schools (e.g., Li,
2012). Dizon-Ross (2014), on the other hand, ﬁnds that a lower accountability grade among
30
Table 5: The Eﬀect of Accountability on Teacher Sorting, DDD-speciﬁcation
Rest of the country as comparison group Large cities as comparison group
Oslo -0.041 (0.006)*** -0.029 (0.008)***
Lower Secondary, Oslo -0.002 (0.010) -0.011 (0.015)
Lower Secondary -0.010 (0.012) -0.001 (0.016)
Oslo*Lower Secondary*2004 -0.004 (0.009) 0.003 (0.010)
Oslo*Lower Secondary*2005 0.015 (0.009) 0.019 (0.011)
Oslo*Lower Secondary*2006 0.036 (0.010)*** 0.027 (0.012)**
R-squared 0.017 0.029
Number of observations 13 495 4 268
Note: See Table 2
schools at the bottom end of the school grade distribution decreases teacher turnover among
high-quality teachers and increases joining teachers' quality.
Even if we identify a positive sorting eﬀect, it is not certain that the same result applies to
all parts of the country. School districts facing diﬃculties with recruitment in the ﬁrst place
are constrained in recruiting high ability teachers, and negative sorting may thus be a concern.
In Oslo, we ﬁnd that the positive sorting eﬀect is smaller for schools with the highest turnover
in the reform period. Schools that need to hire a high number of new teachers struggle to
attract enough teachers with high academic achievements.
Table 6 shows the compositional eﬀects concerning other teacher characteristics than abil-
ity. Column 1 shows how the male share in the schools are aﬀected by the reform. There
are positive eﬀects on the male share in 2005, but such a ﬁnding disappears in 2006. For
all other characteristics (educational level, experience and age), the compositional eﬀect is
growing with exposure time to the reform: We ﬁnd a slight negative eﬀect on the share with
a designated teacher degree, a decrease in experience as a teacher, and reduced mean age
at the schools. In 2006, i.e., the third year after implementation, the mean experience is on
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Table 6: Other Compositional Eﬀects, DDD-speciﬁcation
Male share Educational level Experience Age
Reform eﬀect
2004 0.005 (0.007) -0.015 (0.007)** 0.094 (0.137) -0.300 (0.172)*
2005 0.028 (0.008)*** -0.016 (0.007)** -0.171 (0.148) -0.329 (0.183)*
2006 -0.001 (0.008) -0.020 (0.007)*** -0.277 (0.163)*** -0.616 (0.192)***
R-squared 0.241 0.192 0.173 0.188
Number of observations 13 495 13 495 13 495 13 495
Note: See Table 2
average reduced by a third of a year. Table A.1 shows that mean experience in the sample is
10 years. This could explain why we do not ﬁnd even larger compositional eﬀects for age and
experience.
The sorting eﬀects are more subtle than the mobility eﬀects. If estimating a similar model
as Equation 3 only with number of teachers quitting as the outcome variable, on average
between 2 and 2,5 more teachers quit in each school per year following the reform. The
teacher workforce in each school consists of on average 30 persons. It thus takes time before
there are any substantial compositional changes in the teacher workforce. Teacher composition
eﬀects, in contrast to teacher turnover, are not immediate responses, but are accumulated over
time. That is, a sorting eﬀect in year t does not only depend on changes in the teacher ability-
composition in year t, but also the years in advance. We therefore cannot attribute a 2006
sorting eﬀect only to the external part of the reform.
6 What about student achievement?
Ideally, we would like to measure the impact of school accountability on student achievement,
and furthermore decompose a potential net eﬀect into sorting and incentive eﬀects. However,
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we are not able to identify a causal eﬀect on student achievement. No measure of student per-
formance is available for primary education, thus we cannot use the same empirical approach
as for the mobility and sorting analysis. A common trend assumption across school districts
is a strong assumption when each school district is responsible for its own policies. In addi-
tion, the treated school district is diﬀerent from other school districts in terms of teacher and
student composition: Oslo has a higher share of immigrant students, more dispersed social
background of the student body, and more teachers with a master's degree compared to the
rest of the country.
There are only two years of observations pre-reform. We therefore do not compose a
synthetic control group. For decomposing any eﬀects on student achievement into incentive
and sorting eﬀects, it would be necessary to link teachers and students for a measure of teacher
value added. Such data are not available to us.
Even though we cannot make causal inference with our DD-framework, comparing student
achievement in Oslo to the rest of the country, it is interesting to check if there are any patterns
in the data following the nested school accountability reform. To measure the inﬂuences on
student achievement, we construct an index based on 10th grade performance. It includes
grades obtained in Math, English and Norwegian, in addition to central exam scores, and
corresponds to the unadjusted school quality indicator calculated for all schools in Oslo in
2005. The test scores are normalized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
We ﬁnd a negative estimate of being in a lower secondary school in the reform district in
both 2004 (signiﬁcant) and 2005 (not signiﬁcant). In 2006, it shifts to a small, but signiﬁcantly
positive estimate, which amounts to about 3 percent of a standard deviation.
Teacher-awarded grades are at least partially within the control of teachers and are there-
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fore more manipulable than central exam scores. We ﬁnd, however, no indication of teachers
in Oslo inﬂating their students' grades as they do not seem to increase more relative to central
exam scores. The use of student grades and exams scores as a performance indicator, that
are high stakes for the students, and excluding sanctions and rewards may have facilitated a
non-gaming behavior. The choice of performance indicator and the lack of gaming may also
explain the low increase in student achievement that we ﬁnd in Oslo relative to other studies.
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive placebo eﬀect in 2003. We are thus not able to conﬁrm a
common trend before the reform.18 Although not causal, our results on student achievement
are coherent with the ﬁndings on teacher sorting, with a positive sorting eﬀect in terms of
teacher ability in 2006. Positive sorting accumulated over time may lead to improved student
performance in 2006.
There are other compositional changes due to the reform. Teacher experience, which is
considered relevant for student achievement (e.g., Wiswall, 2013), is slightly reduced. Posi-
tive sorting in terms of teacher ability and decreased experience level could pull in diﬀerent
directions, and impede the inﬂuence of positive sorting.
Teacher turnover may in itself have a negative eﬀect on student achievement (e.g., Ronfeldt
et. al., 2013), and could be linked to the decreased student achievement that we ﬁnd in the
ﬁrst years of the reform.
We cannot rule out that the market element added in 2005 contributed to increasing
student achievement through an incentive eﬀect. Furthermore, there might be an additional
incentive eﬀect through teacher sorting: Joining teachers of high quality may work as an incen-
18We also construct a comparison group based on propensity score matching; matched on characteristics for
parental education, migration characteristics (migration age and migration area), and teacher characteristics
(gender and education). Using such a comparison group does not alter our results.
34
tive for incumbent teachers to increase their eﬀort and performance (Jackson and Bruegmann,
2009).
When checking the eﬀects on student achievement for the schools with the highest turnover
in the treatment period, the eﬀects on student achievement is smaller than the results from
the whole sample. Schools with turnover above the mean also have smaller positive eﬀects
on teacher sorting, indicating that positive sorting could contribute positively to student
achievement.
7 Concluding remarks
It is essential to understand teacher mobility and teacher sorting if we want to design adequate
incentives for teachers and comprehend school performance. In this paper, we have studied
two accountability regimes, one internal and one external, and evaluated their causal eﬀects
on teacher mobility and sorting. We have also discussed teacher sorting as a mechanism for
increased student achievement under school accountability.
We ﬁnd signiﬁcantly increased teacher mobility in the years after the internal part of the
reform. When using a DDD-estimator, we ﬁnd that teacher mobility increases with about 6
percentage points after the reform from a baseline of 10 percent. The external part does not
trigger teacher turnover to a higher extent than the internal part. The majority of teachers
who change jobs leave the public school sector entirely.
Although the turnover rate increases substantially, the increase in the number of teachers
leaving their job is still not dramatic. On average between 2 and 2,5 more teachers quit in
each school per year following the reform, from an average teacher stock of 30 persons.
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We ﬁnd that high-ability teachers respond more strongly in terms of teacher mobility than
low-ability teachers. Nonetheless, high-ability teachers are largely replaced by high-ability
teachers: Despite adverse turnover eﬀects, treated schools experience a positive sorting eﬀect
after the external reform, as measured in terms of teachers' own grades from higher education.
In contrast to teacher turnover, teacher sorting eﬀects are not likely to be immediate responses,
but are accumulated over time. We therefore cannot attribute the positive sorting eﬀect only
to the external part of the reform.
In accordance with the ﬁndings for teacher sorting, we ﬁnd a small positive relationship
between student achievement and school accountability after the external part of the reform.
With more suitable data, the causal impact on student achievement could be studied, and
sorting and incentive eﬀects could be better disentangled by linking teachers and students.
Furthermore, comparing a value added measure to an indicator of teachers' own grades could
be interesting in order to see how strongly these two measures of teacher quality are correlated.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimated Sample (fractions unless otherwise noted)
sample oslo other school districts
lower secondary primary lower secondary primary
outcome variable
Transition (2000-2006) 10.24 10.99 13.71 8.60 10.61
Transition (2000-2003) 8.95 7.02 13.32 6.97 9.41
explanatory variables
Male 28.46 38.41 18.92 42.36 23.01
Age (average) 42.78 42.51 40.55 43.32 42.76
Experience (average) 10.52 9.53 9.20 11.10 10.42
Unemployment (average) 0.014 0.020 0.020 0.013 0.013
Education at Master's level 10.25 39.32 6.78 21.36 4.85
Teacher Education at Bachelor's level 87.92 57.97 89.87 76.59 93.58
Teacher Education at Master's level 1.83 2.72 3.35 2.05 1.57
Number of observations 278909 5598 16598 77 601 179 112
Number of teachers 64306 1426 4413 19390 43270
Note: The number of teachers in the diﬀerent subgroups does not add up to the total number in the sample due to mobility
across groups.
Table A.2: Types of Teacher Transitions
Transitions Percent
Stay in the same school 250 349 89.76
New school, same school district 5 030 1.80
New school, new school district 4 070 1.46
Leave school sector 19 462 6.98
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